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comPulsoRy licensing in tRiPs: chinese 
And indiAn comPARAtive AdvAntAge in the 
mAnufActuRe And exPoRtAtion of gReen 
technologies
by Rishi R. Gupta*
Challengers to the United States’ global influence, such as Brazil, China, and India, have criticized heavy pol-luters like the United States and the United Kingdom 
for significantly contributing to the world’s total carbon emis-
sions but failing to share its green technologies with the rest 
of the world.1 Utilizing Rio+20 to redefine Article 31(b) of the 
World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement should create an inter-
national framework for transfer of green technology through 
a patent process called compulsory licensing.2 Compulsory 
licensing allows a country to bypass a patent and create a 
generic copy of a technology by licensing it within its borders.3
Currently, the United States holds the largest number of 
patents for green technology in various sectors, including: 
wind, solar photovoltaic, concentrated solar power, biomass-
to-electricity, and carbon capture and storage.4 Unfortunately, 
given the long statutory periods provided to patent holders and 
the high costs of entering the green technology market, these 
patents effectively provide the patent holder with a twenty 
year monopoly.5 Thus, this intellectual property barrier inhib-
its financially strapped developing countries from acquiring 
the newest and most effective technologies, preventing them 
from mitigating the environmental consequences of their rapid 
growth.6 At the same time, China and India have a compara-
tive advantage in the manufacturing of green technologies over 
companies in the United States and are able to produce these 
technologies at much lower costs.7
While a compulsory license typically requires a country to 
prove that it attempted and failed to secure a voluntary license, 
the TRIPS agreement waives this requirement in cases of 
national emergency, circumstances of extreme urgency, or for 
public non-commercial use.8 Specifically, the WTO should use 
Rio+20 to recognize that greenhouse gas emissions are a cir-
cumstance of “extreme urgency.”9 In 2003 at Doha, the WTO 
extended compulsory licenses to the exportation of pharma-
ceuticals, allowing a country with the requisite manufacturing 
capacity to obtain a compulsory license to manufacture phar-
maceutical products that alleviate public health problems.10 
Brazil and Thailand have used the WTO’s 2003 decision to 
spread cheaper AIDS medication and put pressure on patent 
holders to decrease their prices.11 This manufacturing and 
exportation model of compulsory licensing could be similarly 
employed in countries like China and India for transfer and dis-
semination of green technology.12
However, this type of compulsory licensing is often 
criticized because of its potential harm to economic growth 
in patent holding countries and the expansion of future green 
technologies.13 Critics argue that strong patents reward patent 
holders for their innovations, thereby incentivizing future inno-
vations in green technology.14 These enforceable patents are 
generally regarded as necessary to guarantee profits for the pat-
ent holder.15 Some of this impact would be mitigated, however, 
because compulsory licensing requires that the licensor pay 
the patent holder adequate remuneration, which typically takes 
the form of royalties.16 Moreover, the need for compulsory 
licenses usually arises in countries where the patent holder has 
chosen not to make its green technology available, so there is 
not a significant loss in either profits or incentives to innovate 
because these countries were already shut out of the market.17
Beyond economics, the environmental impact of compul-
sory green technology licenses in China and India would be 
extremely positive for the entire globe. Primarily, technology 
transfer through compulsory licensing would speed up global 
green technology development by allowing companies in China 
and India to begin innovating and improving on currently held 
patents without having to wait the full twenty years.18 Indeed, 
by impeding research and development in China and India, 
the current intellectual property regime severely limits the 
possibility of follow-on innovations that could lead to further 
breakthroughs in the field.19
The proliferation of advanced green technologies in the 
economically developing countries of China, the world’s larg-
est emitter of greenhouse gas emissions, and India, the fourth 
largest emitter, would be felt immediately. 20 Other developing 
countries could attain greater means to reduce their emissions 
because compulsory licensing would significantly reduce high 
start-up costs by allowing China and India to manufacture 
significantly cheaper green technologies.21 Smaller, developing 
countries would also see a significant decrease in the cost of 
green technology due to China and India’s cheaper manufactur-
ing capabilities in wind and solar energy. 22
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Information and technology transfer to China and India 
through compulsory licensing offers a unique opportunity 
to exploit the benefits of international trade to promote an 
environmentally sustainable future. However, international 
cooperation at the Rio+20 conference will be crucial in promot-
ing this opportunity by finally dealing with the issue of how 
to maintain intellectual property rights while disseminating 
the benefits of these technologies. While methods to mitigate 
short-term economic costs should be considered, Rio+20 must 
recognize the promise that compulsory licensing holds for 
reducing emissions in the long run and acknowledge the urgent 
need to make green technology available to the developing world 
at an affordable price.
55Spring 2012
l. & tech. Rev. (2009) (explaining the unique hurdle that intellectual property 
rights create).
7 See Rasmus Lema and Adrian Lema, Whither Technology Transfer? The 
Rise of China and India in Green Technology Sectors, paper prepared for the 8th 
GLOBELICS International Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 17 (2010).
8 TRIPS Agreement, 1869 U.N.T.S. 313.
9 See Eco-Accord, United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, 
Proposals for Rio+20: Sustainable Development Needs a New Impetus ¶ 15 
(Nov. 1, 2011).
10 See Robert Fair, Does Climate Change Justify Compulsory Licensing of 
Green Technology?, 6 inteRnAtionAl lAw & mAnAgement Review 21, 26 
(2009); for how to cite this decision- http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/
TRIPS_e/implem_para6_e.htm.
11 See Fair, supra note 9, at 28.
12 See Wong, supra note 8.
13 See generally tim wilson, institute of Public AffAiRs, undeRmining 
mitigAtion technology: comPulsoRy licensing, PAtents And tARiffs (2008) 
(claiming that compulsory licensing would have a negative effect on economic 
growth and green technology innovation).
14 See Bronwyn H. Hall and Christian Helmers, The Role of Patent Protection 
in (Clean) Technology Transfer, 26 sAntA clARA comPuteR & high tech. l.J. 
487, 492 (2010).
15 See id. at 493.
16 See TRIPS Agreement, 1869 U.N.T.S. 313; Veronique Greenwood, Who 
Owns Green Tech?, seed mAgAzine (Jul. 30, 2009), http://seedmagazine.com/
content/article/intellectual_property_who_owns_green_tech/.
17 See JeRome ReichmAn et Al., chAthAm house, intellectuAl PRoPeRty 
And AlteRnAtives: stRAtegies foR gReen innovAtion 30 (2008) (noting that 
compulsory licensing is especially useful when companies refuse to make the 
technology affordable in a particular country).
18 Rasmus Lema and Adrian Lema, Whither Technology Transfer? The Rise  
of China and India in Green Technology Sectors, paper prepared for the 8th  
GLOBELICS International Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 19 (2010) 
(noting the importance of licensing to spur more competition and innovation  
in China and India).
19 See Cameron Hutchison, Does TRIPS Facilitate or Impede Climate Change 
Technology Transfer into Developing Countries?, 3 u. ottAwA l. & tech. 
J. 517, 527-28 (2006) (recognizing that inflexible intellectual property rights 
regimes can stifle follow-on innovations).
20 Katy Daigle, Associated press, Rising powers say new bank can help 
development
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jcvOCTIx57W9v4p85b
hnFNfSCkqA?docId=951a797b59ab4a289d0ac09128eef0c6.
21 See Robert Fair, Does Climate Change Justify Compulsory Licensing of 
Green Technology?, 6 inteRnAtionAl lAw & mAnAgement Review 21, 22 (2009).
22 See Joanna I. Lewis, Building a National Wind Turbine Industry: Experi-
ences from China, India, and South Korea, 5 int’l J. tech. & globAlisAtion 
281, 283-90 (2011); Lema and Lema, supra note 18, at 8-13; Ucillia Wang, 
Chinese Manufacturers Cement Their Hold on Global Solar Market, foRbes 
(Feb. 27, 2012, 1:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2012/02/27/
chinese-manufacturers-cement-their-hold-on-global-solar-market/.
Endnotes: inteRnAtionAl investment lAw And ARbitRAtion, sustAinAble develoPment, And Rio+20: imPRoving 
coRPoRAte institutionAl And stAte goveRnAnce
  continued from page 28
35 Roland Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ and Sustainable  
Development, in sustAinAble develoPment in woRld investment lAw  
241-42 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W. Gehring, & Andrew  
Newcombe eds., 2011).
36 See generally Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003).
37 Id. at ¶154 (cited in MTD v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/01/7, Award, 
¶112; Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. 
UN3467, Award, ¶185 (July 1, 2004).
38 Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 
¶304-05 (Mar. 17, 2006) See, IISD, at 17-18.
39 Kläger, supra note 37, at 242.
40 Id.
41 See IISD, supra note 35, at 18-19.
42 See Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement Between the  
Republic of India and the Republic of Singapore, India-Sing., June 29, 2005.
43 Id.
44 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 206 (1987).
45 See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,  
Taking of Property, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/15 (2000), http://www. 
unctad.org/en/docs//psiteiitd15.en.pdf.
46 Id.
47 OECD, “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International  
Investment Law, International Investment Law: A Changing Landscape (2005).
48 Id. at 46-47.
49 Id. at 44.
50 Id.
51 Caroline Henckels, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate, 15 J. 
int’l econ. l. 223, 225 (2012) (Fn. 4).
52 Waste Management v. United Mexican States (Waste Management II), 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award (April 30, 2004), http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/34643.pdf.
53 Id. at ¶¶ 159,160.
54 Henckels, supra note 53, at 225.
55 Tecnicas Medioambientales S.A. v. Mexico (TECMED), ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC602_En&caseId=C186.
56 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 
Award (Aug. 30, 2000), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestT
ype=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC542_En&caseId=C155.
57 Id. at ¶ 111.
58 Methanex Corporation v. United States at Part II, Chap. D, ¶ 16.
59 Id. at Part I, ¶ 1.
60 Id.
61 Methanex, Part IV, Chap. D, ¶ 7.
62 IISD, supra note 35, at 22, 23.
63 See IISD, supra note 35, at 23-24.
64 united stAtes model bilAteRAl investment tReAty, Article 3(1), (2004), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf. Article 3(2) sets 
forth the same language, with the exception that the word “investments” is 
substituted for the word “investors” as it appears in Article 3(1).
65 Kate Miles, Sustainable Development, National Treatment and Like 
Circumstances in Investment Law in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN 
WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 265, 268-269 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, 
Markus W. Gehring, Andrew Newcombe eds., 2011).
66 See id. at 269 (describing a broad interpretation of the term, which in  
turn captures a range of regulation and governmental decision-making that  
is virtually limitless).
67 Id.
68 Miles, supra note 67, at 269.
69 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, First Partial Arbitral Award, ¶ 
243 (Nov. 13, 2000), 8 ICSID Rep. 3 at 52-53.
70 Id. at 55, ¶ 256.
71 Id. at 26, ¶¶ 89-93.
72 Id. at 29, ¶¶ 109-112.
73 Id. at 54, ¶¶ 250.
74 Id. at 76, ¶¶ 241-56.
75 Id. at 54, ¶¶ 251, 255.
76 Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶ 78,  
Arbitral Tribunal (April 10, 2001) available at http://www.international.gc.ca/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Award_Merits-e.pdf.
77 IISD, supra note 35, at 29.
78 See IISD, supra note 35, at 50.
